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Endogenous Private Leadership under Subsidy Policy on the Social Enterprises† 
Sumi Cho* and Sang-Ho Lee∗* 
We investigate a mixed oligopoly model in which private enterprises compete with social enterprises 
under government subsidy policy, and examine the endogenous choice of private leadership. We show 
that private leadership is socially desirable, but the numbers of private and social enterprises affect 
endogenous choices and welfare consequences. We also show that the role of government in choosing 
the optimal subsidy will be significant when there are more than one private enterprises but its number 
is smaller than that of the social enterprises. 
Keywords: Social Enterprise; Private Enterprise; Private Leadership; Private Followership; 
Subsidization; 
JEL Classification L13; D45; H23 
1. Introduction 
During the last decades, non-profit organizations have been developed and expanded since social 
sector organizations, such as co-operatives and social enterprises, have entered social economy with 
more entrepreneurial characters. For instance, G8 Social Impact Investment Taskforce reports that 
social sector organizations already account for more than 5% of GDP in several countries, including 
Canada, Germany, the UK and the US. In some EU countries such as Italy and France, they employ 
more than 10% of the workforce. According to the European Commission, one in four companies in the 
EU falls into the social economy category.1  
Contrary to private enterprises (PEs), which pursue their own profits, the initiatives of the social 
enterprises (SEs) supply social goods2 and generate social values such as supporting public welfare 
such as health care, creating jobs for the underprivileged, reducing poverty and undernourishment, and 
so on. Thus, understanding the competition in the context of mixed market configuration between SEs 
and PEs has now challenged economic performances and social impacts in the society.  
However, SEs have different financial structures and sometimes they are financially supported by 
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government subsidy. Thus, the performances of SEs in the social economy depend heavily upon market 
structure and government regulation. For example, Remploy Ltd. in the UK supports the employment 
of people with disabilities and promotes the creation of sustainable employment.3 It has its own 
operating revenue but government grants account for 40% of its total revenue. The Goodwill in the US 
has also its own operating revenue but government grants account for 20%.4 
 Several recent studies have examined the competition between SEs and PEs in mixed oligopolies, 
and the performances of government subsidies. Two approaches are suggested in the formation of the 
objectives of SEs. On the one hand, SEs are confined to pursue both profit and social concerns such as 
consumer surplus and/or environmental damage. For example, Kopel and Brand (2012) Lambertini and 
Tampieri (2015), Brand and Grothe (2015), Liu, et al. (2015), Flores and Gracia (2016) and Bian, et al. 
(2016) analyzed the PEs with corporate social responsibilities. They show that firms’ profits and social 
welfare can be improved when firms consider consumer welfare and/or environmental pollution to be 
social concerns. Regarding the endogenous competition structure of mixed oligopolies, for example, 
Matsumura and Ogawa (2012, 2014) and Scrimitore (2013, 2014) and Haraguchi and Matsumura (2016) 
showed that competition structure is changed if one firm is a welfare maximizer and the other firm is a 
profit maximizer. This suggests the possibility that non-profit maximizing objectives may change the 
competition structure 
On the other hand, Crémer et al. (1989), Estrin and de Meza (1995), Bennett and La Manna (2012) 
and Cho and Lee (2017) incorporated the social concerns solely into the objective function of SEs. In 
their analyses, SEs produce their outputs and support social values under a break-even constraint, which 
encompasses a wide range of social activities such as expanding employment level and improving 
consumer surplus. In special, Cho and Lee (2017) considered social activity as an externality of 
production and investigated market competition between PE and SE under subsidy policy. They showed 
that private leadership is better for total social welfare and the number of PEs affects not only 
profitability but welfare. 
In this study, adopting the second approach, we consider a mixed oligopoly where multiple SEs 
compete with PEs under government subsidy, and investigate the interactions between PEs and SEs. 
Further, we endogenize the choice of market role between private leadership and private followership, 
and find the relationship between the relative numbers of PEs and SEs and the equilibrium of 
endogenous choices. We also examine the welfare consequences in both cases between first-mover and 
second-mover of government choice on subsidization.  
We summarize the main findings of this paper. First, the optimal subsidy for SEs under private 
                                                                        
3 Remploy is a government-led social enterprise for the disabled people. It was founded in 1945 as a full-fledged 
government fund under “Disability Employment Act” in the UK, enacted in 1944. In the employment law, some 
companies, such as Ford and Unilever, are employing disabled workers in connection with Remploy like Tesco. 
4 Kim, et al. (2015, Chapter 3) examined social enterprise employment for the disabled. 
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leadership is higher than that under private followership. This is because private leadership increases 
the output of the PEs but decreases the output of the SEs. Second, the output of SE under private 
followership is higher than that under private leadership, while both output of the PE and total market 
outputs under private followership are lower than those under private leadership. This implies that the 
SEs expand their outputs more under private followership to increase social value, while the PEs expand 
their outputs more under private leadership. Third, total social welfare under private followership is 
lower than that under private leadership. Therefore, private leadership is socially desirable than private 
followership because private leadership can induce PEs to behave aggressive, which increases total 
market outputs. Finally, we also show that the role of government in choosing the optimal subsidy 
policy will be significant when there are more than one PEs but its number is smaller than that of SEs. 
In particular, the regions for the private leadership for being an equilibrium of endogenous competition 
mode is reduced when the government chooses the optimal subsidy after the PEs choose the competition 
mode, in which the total social welfare can be reduced. Therefore, the role of government should be 
emphasized in deciding subsidy policy.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide the basic model with 
three-stage game. In section 3, we analyze two modes of market competition in the third stage, private 
leadership and private followership, respectively, and examined the endogenous choice of market role 
in the second stage. In section 4, we provide the optimal subsidy policy on the SEs in the first stage. In 
section 5, we discuss policy implications. Finally, in section 6, we conclude the study. 
2. The Model 
We consider an oligopoly market in which 𝑚𝑚 + 𝑛𝑛  enterprises produce homogeneous products, 
where 𝑚𝑚 (≥ 1) social enterprises (SEs) and 𝑛𝑛 (≥ 1) private enterprises (PEs) compete with outputs 
in the market trade. We denote 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 as the output of the SE 𝑗𝑗 (= 1, … ,𝑚𝑚), and 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 as the output of the 
PE 𝑖𝑖 (= 1, … ,𝑛𝑛). Market price 𝑃𝑃 is given by a linear inverse demand function: 
𝑃𝑃 = 𝐴𝐴 − 𝑄𝑄                                                        .         (1) 
where 𝐴𝐴 is the market size and Q = ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 +𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗=1 ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 . Then, consumer surplus can be denoted by CS = 1
2
𝑄𝑄2.  
We assume that the identical quadratic cost functions of both types of enterprises,5 𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝑘𝑘) = 12 𝑞𝑞𝑘𝑘2 
                                                                        
5 We adopt traditional assumption in mixed oligopolies that there are diseconomies of scale and thus the optimal 
productions exist. See, for example, Kopel and Brand (2012), Lambertini and Tampieri (2015), Brand and Grothe 
(2015), Liu, et al. (2015), Flores and Gracia (2016) and Bian, et al. (2016). If we assume a constant marginal cost, 
however, corner solutions appear in the equilibrium, depending on the relative size of marginal social value, b, 
and the number of SE, m 
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where 𝑘𝑘 = 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗. We also assume that government can provide an output subsidy with the rate of s to the 
SEs to support their social benefits in the social economy. Then, the profits of the SE and PE are 
respectively as follows:  
𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗 = (𝐴𝐴 − ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗=1 − ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 )𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 − 12 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗2 + 𝑠𝑠𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗,  𝑗𝑗 = 1, 2. . .𝑚𝑚                          (2) 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = �𝐴𝐴 − ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗=1 − ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 �𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 − 12 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖2, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2 …𝑛𝑛.                                 (3) 
While the PE maximizes its profit, the SE aims to create social value such as the well-being of co-
operatives and large employment of disadvantaged and/or aged workers despite incurring high costs. 
We also assume that the SE maximizes both economic market value, which is defined as consumer 
surplus in the market trade, and intrinsic social value, which is created from its social activities. For 
example, job creation or wage expenditure on the underprivileged can be counted as social concerns, as 
these can be used to combat poverty and undernourishment. We consider this social value as an 
externality of production activity and thus, assume that social value is proportional to the SE’s output 
level. In specific, the objective of the SE is to maximize the following function under non-negative 
profit: 
𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗 = CS + 𝑏𝑏 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗,   𝑠𝑠. 𝑡𝑡   𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗 ≥ 0                                                   (4) 
where 𝑏𝑏 (> 0) is interpreted as the marginal social value of the economic activities of the SE. 
Note that there is an externality in output of social enterprises and the activities of the SE are constrained 
by the economic constraint of non-negative profit, which supports its survival under subsidy policy. 
This formulation with a break-even constraint is sufficiently general to cover a wide range of public 
concerns such as employment level and social activities.6 To analyze the interior solutions in the 
equilibrium, we assume that the market size is sufficiently large, i.e., 0 < 𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚 < 𝐴𝐴. 
Finally, the government can subsidize the SEs under the financial requirement that its economic 
profit should be non-negative in (4). We assume that the benevolent government maximizes total social 
welfare, which is defined as the sum of economic welfare and social value, where economic welfare 
contains consumer surplus ( 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ) and producer surplus (∑ 𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 )  minus the subsidy 
expenditures of the government (𝑠𝑠 ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗=1 ) as follows:7 
                                                                        
6 Because the break-even constraint prevents the imposition of the fully optimal, so called first-best, marginal 
cost prices, we refer to prices which maximize total surplus subject to breaking even as optimal second-best. See 
Cremer et al. (1989), Estrin and de Meza (1995), and Bennett and La Manna (2012). In particular, Cho and Lee 
(2017) explicitly considered the social value created by the social activities of the SEs to be a positive externality 
of market activities. 
7 From the normative perspective, we can show that SE produces positive outputs in the market equilibrium at 
the first-best optimum, which maximizes (5) without subsidization if 𝐴𝐴 > 𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚, but it cannot earn non-negative 
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𝑊𝑊 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝑏𝑏 ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 − 𝑠𝑠 ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗=1                                (5) 
The timing and structure of the game are as follows: In the first stage, government decides output 
subsidy to maximize total social welfare. In the second stage, PEs and SEs decide the mode of market 
competition. Following Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), we consider the observable delay game in 
choosing the competition mode. That is, PEs and SEs simultaneously and independently chooses 
whether to move early or late. Then, simultaneous choice becomes Cournot, while sequential choice 
becomes Stackelberg. In the last stage, PEs and SEs choose outputs simultaneously or sequentially 
under the committed competition mode in the second stage. We solve the subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium by backward induction. 
Before proceeding the analysis, it is noteworthy that the market role of the SEs does not affect the 
market equilibrium when the PEs follow because the optimal reactions of the PEs are the same under 
the zero-profit condition of SEs.8 Hence, we focus on two different modes of market competition 
between the SEs and PEs under subsidization. The first case is Cournot competition in which both the 
SEs and the PEs are followers and thus, choose the outputs simultaneously. The other case is Stackelberg 
competition in which the PEs lead and the SEs follow sequentially. Note again that the reverse case of 
Stackelberg competition where the SE leads and the PEs follow sequentially is the same case of Cournot 
competition where the SEs and PEs choose their outputs simultaneously.  
3. Endogenous Choice of Market Competition 
In the last stage, PEs and SEs choose outputs simultaneously or sequentially under the competition 
mode between Cournot and Stackelberg. In the below, we analyze and compare the results, respectively. 
3.1 Private Followership: Cournot Competition 
In Cournot competition, SEs and PEs choose outputs simultaneously. The profit-maximization 
condition of the PEs in (3) provides the following reaction function:  
 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴−∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗=12+𝑛𝑛                                                                (6) 
For the case of the SEs, we know that 𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗 in (4) is increasing in 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗. This implies that the zero-profit 
condition of the SEs is binding at the optimum. That is, the SEs do not behave strategically by choosing 
the optimal decision, which is simply determined by the zero-profit condition. Thus, the zero-profit 
condition of the SEs in (2) provides the following reaction function : 
                                                                        
profits without government subsidization. 
8 We can easily show that the simultaneous choice between the SEs and PEs provides the same results as the 
sequential choice where the SE leads and the PEs follow sequentially. 
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𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 = 2(𝐴𝐴+𝑠𝑠−∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 )1+2𝑚𝑚                                                             (7) 
Note that products are strategic substitutes and the reaction function of the SEs is less sensitive, i.e., 
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
= − 2
1+2𝑚𝑚
< 0. Thus, we have the following equilibrium outcomes from the symmetric output of 
the PEs:  
 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 = 4𝐴𝐴+2(2+𝑛𝑛)𝑠𝑠2+4𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛 ,   𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴−2𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠2+4𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛, and   Q = 4𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚+𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛+4𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠2+4𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛                            (8) 
Note that 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗  >  𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 irrespective of the number of firms and the subsidy rate. The marginal social 
value does not directly affect equilibrium output. As the subsidy increases, the output of the SE 
increases while that of the PE decreases. The equilibrium output of the SE is greater than that of the PE 
if the subsidy is non-negative. 
The profits of the SEs and PEs and total social welfare are as follows: 
𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗 = 0 < 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 3(𝐴𝐴−2𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠)22(2+4𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛)2 ,                                                   (9) 
𝑊𝑊 = 8𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚(2+4𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛)+𝐴𝐴2(3𝑛𝑛+(4𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛)2)−4𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚(4+3𝑛𝑛)𝑠𝑠+4𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠(𝐴𝐴(2+𝑛𝑛)(2+4𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛)−4𝑠𝑠−(4+𝑛𝑛)(𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛)𝑠𝑠)
2(2+4𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛)2 .    (10) 
3.2 Private Leadership: Stackelberg Competition 
In Stackelberg private leadership competition, profit-maximizing PEs play market leaders and thus 
move first with the SEs following sequentially. The SEs does not choose its output strategically and 
thus the reaction function is the same as that in (7). Then, the profit function of the PEs becomes: 
 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = �𝐴𝐴 − ∑ (2(𝐴𝐴+𝑠𝑠−𝑛𝑛𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖)1+2𝑚𝑚 )𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗=1 − ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 � 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 − 12 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖2 = 0   .                          (11) 
The first-order condition of the PEs is as follows: 
 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
= 𝐴𝐴−2𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠−(2+2𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
1+2𝑚𝑚
= 0.                                                 (12) 
Solving these equations provides the following equilibrium outcomes: 
 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 = 4𝐴𝐴(1+𝑚𝑚)+2(2+𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚(1+𝑛𝑛))𝑠𝑠(1+2𝑚𝑚)(2+2𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛) , 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴−2𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠2+2𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛 , and 𝑄𝑄 = 𝐴𝐴(𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚(2+2𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛))+4𝑚𝑚(1+𝑚𝑚)𝑠𝑠(1+2𝑚𝑚)(2+2𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛)     (13) 
Note that 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗
>
<
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 if 𝑠𝑠
>
<
−
𝐴𝐴(3+2𝑚𝑚)
2(2+3𝑚𝑚+2𝑚𝑚2+𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛). The marginal social value does not directly affect 
equilibrium output. As the subsidy increases, the output of the SEs increases while that of the PEs 
decreases. The equilibrium output of the SE is greater (smaller) than that of the PE if the subsidy is 
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large (small). 
The profits of the SEs and PEs and total social welfare are as follows, respectively: 
𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗 = 0 <  𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = (3+2𝑚𝑚)(𝐴𝐴−2𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠)22(1+2𝑚𝑚)(2+2𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛)2                                             (14) 
    𝑊𝑊 = (8𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚(1+𝑚𝑚)(1+2𝑚𝑚)(2+2𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛)+𝐴𝐴2(16�𝑚𝑚+𝑚𝑚2�2+(1+2𝑚𝑚)2(3+4𝑚𝑚)𝑛𝑛+(𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)2)−4𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚(4+3𝑛𝑛+4𝑚𝑚(2+𝑚𝑚)(1+𝑛𝑛))𝑠𝑠+4𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠(𝐴𝐴(1+2𝑚𝑚)(2+2𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛)(2+𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚(1+𝑛𝑛))−(4(1+𝑚𝑚)3+(1+2𝑚𝑚)(4+𝑚𝑚(5+2𝑚𝑚))𝑛𝑛+(𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)2)𝑠𝑠))
2(1+2𝑚𝑚)2(2+2𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛)2   (15) 
3.3 Endogenous Choice of Competition Mode 
In the second stage, PEs decide the mode of market competition by comparing market equilibria 
between private followership and private leadership.  
Proposition 1: Suppose that 𝐴𝐴 > 2𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠. The output of SE under private followership is higher than that 
under private leadership, while both output of the PE and total market outputs under private 
followership are lower than those under private leadership. 
Proof: Comparing the output levels yield the followings: 
𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗
𝐹𝐹 − 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗
𝐿𝐿 = 4𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛(𝐴𝐴−2𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠)(1+2𝑚𝑚)(2+2𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛)(2+4𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛) > 0, 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 − 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 = − 2𝑚𝑚(𝐴𝐴−2𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠)(2+2𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛)(2+4𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛) < 0 and 
𝑄𝑄𝐹𝐹 − 𝑄𝑄𝐿𝐿 = 2𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛(−𝐴𝐴+2𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠)(1+2𝑚𝑚)(2+2𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛)(2+4𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛) < 0.  Q.E.D. 
Proposition 1 implies that consumer surplus under private followership is lower than that under private 
leadership. But, the social value created by the SEs under private followership is higher than that under 
private leadership. Thus, from the viewpoint of SEs, there is a trade-off between private followership 
and private leadership.  
Proposition 2: Suppose that 𝐴𝐴 > 2𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠. The profit of the PE under private followership is lower (higher) 
than that under private leadership when 𝑛𝑛2 >
<
1
4
(1 + 2𝑚𝑚 + √3�3 + 4𝑚𝑚(2 + 𝑚𝑚))2.  
Proof: Comparing the profits of the PEs yields the followings: 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
𝐹𝐹 − 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
𝐿𝐿 = −1
2
4𝑚𝑚(2+5𝑚𝑚+2𝑚𝑚2−𝑛𝑛−2𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛−𝑛𝑛2)(𝐴𝐴−2𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠)2(1+2𝑚𝑚)(2+2𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛)2(2+4𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛)2 ><0 if 2 + 5𝑚𝑚 + 2𝑚𝑚2 − 𝑛𝑛 − 2𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 − 𝑛𝑛2 <> 0 .                    
Q.E.D. 
 Proposition 2 implies that the equilibrium of the endogenous choice on market competition in the 
second stage does not depend on the subsidy rate, but depends on the number of SEs and PEs. Thus, 
the optimal decision on the subsidy rate in the first stage does not affect the endogenous choice on 
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competition mode in the second stage. 
Then, given the number of SEs, 𝑚𝑚,  we have 𝑛𝑛∗(𝑚𝑚) = 1
2
(−1− 2𝑚𝑚 + √3√3 + 8𝑚𝑚 + 4𝑚𝑚2) 
from2 + 5𝑚𝑚 + 2𝑚𝑚2 − 𝑛𝑛 − 2𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 − 𝑛𝑛2 = 0. Fig. 1 shows that the profits under private followership is 
higher if the number of PEs is large, i.e., 𝑛𝑛 > 𝑛𝑛∗(𝑚𝑚). On the other hand, the profits under private 
leadership is higher if 𝑛𝑛 < 𝑛𝑛∗(𝑚𝑚) . Thus, the private followership (leadership) tends to be the 
equilibrium of the endogenous choice if the number of PEs is large (small) 
 
Fig. 1 The profits ranks of PEs under the same subsidy 
Fig. 1. provides a few of interest findings. First, when the number of PEs is larger than that of SEs, 
i.e., 𝑛𝑛 > 𝑚𝑚, private followership is an equilibrium for all 𝑚𝑚 ≥ 1. Second, when the number of PEs is 
equal to that of SEs, i.e., 𝑛𝑛 = 𝑚𝑚, private followership is an equilibrium if 𝑚𝑚 ≥ 5, but private leadership 
is an equilibrium if 𝑚𝑚 < 5. Finally, when the number of PEs is smaller than that of SEs, i.e., 𝑛𝑛 < 𝑚𝑚, 
private leadership is an equilibrium for 𝑛𝑛 ≤ 5. Hence, we can conclude that a larger number of PEs 
yields private followership, while a smaller number of PEs yields private leadership only when the 
number of SEs is small. For example, consider a single SE, 𝑚𝑚 = 1, which is examined by Cho and Lee 
(2017, Proposition 3). Then, private leadership is preferred when 𝑛𝑛 = 1, while private followership is 
preferred when 𝑛𝑛 ≥ 2. It supports that the previous results that the first-mover under Stackelberg 
competition has a higher output effect compared with the price effect, which increases profits. 9 
However, when the number of SEs is more than four, 𝑚𝑚 ≥ 4, the first-mover advantage depends on the 
number of PEs. Thus, the relative numbers between PEs and SEs affect the endogenous choice of private 
                                                                        
9 Ono (1978) examined a homogeneous product market with cost asymmetry, while Van Damme and Hurkens 
(2004) and Amir and Stepanova (2006) analyzed a differentiated product market. 
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leadership.10 In particular, as the number of the PEs is relatively large, competition between private 
leaders intensifies and thus the first-mover advantage disappears.  
4. Endogenous Choice of Subsidization Policy 
In the first stage, government chooses the optimal subsidy on the SEs. Due to the independency between 
the subsidy and the endogenous choice on market competition, as shown in proposition 2, we have two 
cases. The government decides the optimal subsidy rate under the private followership when the number 
of PEs is large, 𝑛𝑛 > 𝑛𝑛∗(𝑚𝑚), while it decides the optimal subsidy rate under the private leadership when 
the number of PEs is small, 𝑛𝑛 < 𝑛𝑛∗(𝑚𝑚). 
4.1 Private Followership under Optimal Subsidy 
From the total social welfare under private followership in (9), the differentiation of 𝑊𝑊 with respect 
to 𝑠𝑠 yields the following optimal subsidy where the superscript F stands for private followership: 
𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹 = 𝐴𝐴(2+𝑛𝑛)(2+4𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛)−𝐴𝐴(4+3𝑛𝑛)
2((2+𝑛𝑛)2+𝑚𝑚(4+𝑛𝑛)) ><0 if 𝑏𝑏 >< 𝐴𝐴(4+3𝑛𝑛)(2+𝑛𝑛)(2+4𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛)                              (16) 
From the assumption that 𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚 < 𝐴𝐴, we have 𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹 < 𝐴𝐴
2𝑚𝑚
. The comparative statics yield: 
𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴
= (2+𝑛𝑛)(2+4𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛)
2((2+𝑛𝑛)2+𝑚𝑚(4+𝑛𝑛)) > 0, 𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚 = (4+3𝑛𝑛)(𝐴𝐴(2+𝑛𝑛)2+𝐴𝐴(4+𝑛𝑛))2((2+𝑛𝑛)2+𝑚𝑚(4+𝑛𝑛))2 > 0and  
𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹
𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛
= − (𝐴𝐴−𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚)(8𝑚𝑚−(2+𝑛𝑛)(2+3𝑛𝑛))
2((2+𝑛𝑛)2+𝑚𝑚(4+𝑛𝑛))2 <>  0  if 𝑚𝑚>< 18 (2 + 𝑛𝑛)(2 + 3𝑛𝑛). 
It represents that the optimal subsidy rate increases as the marginal social value increases or the 
number of SEs increases. As expected, an increased marginal social value or increased number of SEs 
raises the subsidy rate for encouraging the production of the SEs. However, the optimal subsidy depends 
on the number of PEs. The government decreases (increases) the subsidy rate when the number of SEs 
is larger (smaller) than that of the PEs.  
Substituting 𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹 provides the following equilibrium output: 
𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗
𝐹𝐹 = 𝐴𝐴(2+𝑛𝑛)2+𝐴𝐴(4+𝑛𝑛)(2+𝑛𝑛)2+𝑚𝑚(4+𝑛𝑛) , 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 = (𝐴𝐴−𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚)(2+𝑛𝑛)(2+𝑛𝑛)2+𝑚𝑚(4+𝑛𝑛), and 𝑄𝑄𝐹𝐹 = 2𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚(2+𝑛𝑛)+𝐴𝐴(𝑛𝑛(2+𝑛𝑛)+𝑚𝑚(4+𝑛𝑛))(2+𝑛𝑛)2+𝑚𝑚(4+𝑛𝑛)         (17) 
Then, 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝐹𝐹
>
<
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
𝐹𝐹 if 𝑏𝑏 >
<
−
2𝐴𝐴(2+𝑛𝑛)(2+𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛). Note that when the marginal social value of the SEs is large, its 
output is greater than that of the PEs under private followership. 
                                                                        
10 Daughety (1990) and Ino and Matsumura (2012) investigated a Stackelberg model in which 𝑚𝑚 leaders and 
𝑛𝑛 − 𝑚𝑚  followers compete in a homogeneous goods market with identical cost functions and found non-
monotonicity between 𝑚𝑚 and economic performance. 
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The market price is as follows: 
 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹 = 2(𝐴𝐴−𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚)(2+𝑛𝑛)(2+𝑛𝑛)2+𝑚𝑚(4+𝑛𝑛).                                                         (18) 
The profit of the PEs and total social welfare are respectively as follows: 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
𝐹𝐹 = 3(𝐴𝐴−𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚)2(2+𝑛𝑛)2
2((2+𝑛𝑛)2+𝑚𝑚(4+𝑛𝑛))2                                                       (19) 
𝑊𝑊𝐹𝐹 = 𝐴𝐴2𝑚𝑚(2+𝑛𝑛)2+2𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚(4+𝑛𝑛)+𝐴𝐴2(𝑛𝑛(3+𝑛𝑛)+𝑚𝑚(4+𝑛𝑛))
2((2+𝑛𝑛)2+𝑚𝑚(4+𝑛𝑛))                                     (20) 
4.2 Private Leadership under Optimal Subsidy 
From the total social welfare under private followership in (15), the differentiation of 𝑊𝑊  with 
respect to 𝑠𝑠 yields the following optimal subsidy where the superscript L stands for private leadership: 
𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 = −4𝐴𝐴(1+𝑚𝑚)2−𝐴𝐴(3+4𝑚𝑚(2+𝑚𝑚))𝑛𝑛+𝐴𝐴(1+2𝑚𝑚)(2+2𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛)(2+𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚(1+𝑛𝑛))
2(4(1+𝑚𝑚)3+(1+2𝑚𝑚)(4+𝑚𝑚(5+2𝑚𝑚))𝑛𝑛+(𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)2) >< 0 , 
if 𝑏𝑏 >
<
 𝐴𝐴(4+3𝑛𝑛+4𝑚𝑚(2+𝑚𝑚)(1+𝑛𝑛))(1+2𝑚𝑚)(2+2𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛)(2+𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚(1+𝑛𝑛))                                         (21) 
Again, from the assumption that 𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚 < 𝐴𝐴, we have 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 < 𝐴𝐴
2𝑚𝑚
. The comparative statics yield: 
𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴
= (1+2𝑚𝑚)(2+2𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛)(2+𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚(1+𝑛𝑛))
2(4(1+𝑚𝑚)3+(1+2𝑚𝑚)(4+𝑚𝑚(5+2𝑚𝑚))𝑛𝑛+(𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)2) > 0,  
𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿
𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚
= 16(𝐴𝐴+𝐴𝐴)(1+𝑚𝑚)4+4(1+𝑚𝑚)�𝐴𝐴�6+4𝑚𝑚�5+2𝑚𝑚(3+𝑚𝑚)��+𝐴𝐴�7+𝑚𝑚�25+4𝑚𝑚(7+2𝑚𝑚)���𝑛𝑛+(1+2𝑚𝑚)(16𝐴𝐴(1+𝑚𝑚)3+𝐴𝐴(3+2𝑚𝑚)(5+4𝑚𝑚(2+𝑚𝑚)))𝑛𝑛2+(1+2𝑚𝑚)2(4𝐴𝐴+𝐴𝐴(3+4𝑚𝑚(1+𝑚𝑚)))𝑛𝑛3
2(4(1+𝑚𝑚)3+(1+2𝑚𝑚)(4+𝑚𝑚(5+2𝑚𝑚))𝑛𝑛+(𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)2)2 > 0 and 
𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿
𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛
= (1+2𝑚𝑚)(−𝐴𝐴+𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚)(−4(1+𝑚𝑚)2−8(1+𝑚𝑚)2(1+2𝑚𝑚)𝑛𝑛−(3+2𝑚𝑚)(𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)2)
2(4(1+𝑚𝑚)3+(1+2𝑚𝑚)(4+𝑚𝑚(5+2𝑚𝑚))𝑛𝑛+(𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)2)2 > 0,  
iff 𝑛𝑛2 >
<
4(1+𝑚𝑚)4(2+�(1+3𝑚𝑚+2𝑚𝑚2)2(1+6𝑚𝑚+4𝑚𝑚2)+2𝑚𝑚(4+𝑚𝑚(5+2𝑚𝑚)))2  
Similar to private followership, the optimal subsidy rate increases as the marginal social value 
increases or as the number of SEs increases. However, contrary to private followership, the optimal 
subsidy increases as the number of PEs rises. That is, when tough competition occurs under private 
leadership, the government increases the subsidy rate to encourage the production of the SEs 
Substituting 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 provides the equilibrium output levels:  
𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗
𝐿𝐿 = 4𝐴𝐴(1+𝑚𝑚)2+𝐴𝐴(1+2𝑚𝑚)2𝑛𝑛+𝐴𝐴(2+𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚(1+𝑛𝑛))2
4(1+𝑚𝑚)3+(1+2𝑚𝑚)(4+𝑚𝑚(5+2𝑚𝑚))𝑛𝑛+(𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)2 , 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 = (1+2𝑚𝑚)(𝐴𝐴−𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚)(2+𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚(1+𝑛𝑛))4(1+𝑚𝑚)3+(1+2𝑚𝑚)(4+𝑚𝑚(5+2𝑚𝑚))𝑛𝑛+(𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)2 , and 
𝑄𝑄𝐿𝐿 = 4(𝐴𝐴+𝐴𝐴)𝑚𝑚(1+𝑚𝑚)2+(1+2𝑚𝑚)(2𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚(1+𝑚𝑚)+𝐴𝐴(2+𝑚𝑚(3+2𝑚𝑚)))𝑛𝑛+𝐴𝐴(𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)2
4(1+𝑚𝑚)3+(1+2𝑚𝑚)(4+𝑚𝑚(5+2𝑚𝑚))𝑛𝑛+(𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)2                      (22) 
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Thus, 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿
>
<
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
𝐿𝐿 if 𝑏𝑏 >
<
−
2𝐴𝐴(1+𝑚𝑚)(2+2𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)(2+3𝑚𝑚+2𝑚𝑚2+𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛). Note that when the marginal social value of 
the SEs is large, its output is greater than that of the PEs under private leadership. 
The market price is as follows: 
𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 = 2(1+𝑚𝑚)(𝐴𝐴−𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚)(2+𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚(1+𝑛𝑛))
4(1+𝑚𝑚)3+(1+2𝑚𝑚)(4+𝑚𝑚(5+2𝑚𝑚))𝑛𝑛+(𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)2                                      (23) 
The profit of the PEs and total social welfare are respectively as follows: 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
𝐿𝐿 = (𝐴𝐴−𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚)2(3+4𝑚𝑚(2+𝑚𝑚))(2+𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚(1+𝑛𝑛))2
2(4(1+𝑚𝑚)3+(1+2𝑚𝑚)(4+𝑚𝑚(5+2𝑚𝑚))𝑛𝑛+(𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)2)2                                   (24) 
𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿 = 𝐴𝐴2𝑚𝑚�2+𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚(1+𝑛𝑛)�2+2𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚�4+𝑛𝑛+4𝑚𝑚(2+𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛+𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)�+𝐴𝐴2(4𝑚𝑚(1+𝑚𝑚)2+(3+𝑚𝑚(9+4𝑚𝑚(2+𝑚𝑚)))𝑛𝑛+(𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)2)
2(4(1+𝑚𝑚)3+(1+2𝑚𝑚)(4+𝑚𝑚(5+2𝑚𝑚))𝑛𝑛+(𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)2)                                (25) 
4.3 Endogenous Choice of Optimal Subsidy 
We compare the optimal subsidy policies between private followership and private leadership. 
Proposition 3: The optimal subsidy under private followership is lower than that under private 
leadership. 
Proof: Comparing the optimal subsidies in (16) and (21) yields the followings: 
𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹 − 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿 = 2𝑚𝑚(−𝐴𝐴+𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚)𝑛𝑛(2𝑚𝑚2(1+𝑛𝑛)+(1+𝑛𝑛)(2+𝑛𝑛)+𝑚𝑚(3+2𝑛𝑛(3+𝑛𝑛)))((2+𝑛𝑛)2+𝑚𝑚(4+𝑛𝑛))(4(1+𝑚𝑚)3+(1+2𝑚𝑚)(4+𝑚𝑚(5+2𝑚𝑚))𝑛𝑛+(𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)2) < 0.   Q.E.D. 
It represents that the optimal subsidy under private leadership (private followership) should be high-
powered (low-powered) to increase the outputs of SEs. This is because private leadership increases the 
output of the PEs but decreases the output of the SEs, as shown in the following proposition. 
Proposition 4: Under the optimal subsidy, the output of SE under private followership is higher than 
that under private leadership, while both output of the PE and total market outputs under private 
followership are lower than those under private leadership. 
Proof: Comparing the output levels in (17) and (22) yields the followings: 
𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗
𝐹𝐹 − 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗
𝐿𝐿 = 4𝑚𝑚(𝐴𝐴−𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚)𝑛𝑛(2+𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛+𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)((2+𝑛𝑛)2+𝑚𝑚(4+𝑛𝑛))(4(1+𝑚𝑚)3+(1+2𝑚𝑚)(4+𝑚𝑚(5+2𝑚𝑚))𝑛𝑛+(𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)2) >  0.  
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
𝐹𝐹 − 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
𝐿𝐿 = (𝐴𝐴 − 𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚) �− 2𝑚𝑚(4+8𝑚𝑚+4𝑚𝑚2+4𝑛𝑛+9𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛+4𝑚𝑚2𝑛𝑛+𝑛𝑛2+2𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛2)(4+4𝑚𝑚+4𝑛𝑛+𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛+𝑛𝑛2)(4+12𝑚𝑚+12𝑚𝑚2+4𝑚𝑚3+4𝑛𝑛+13𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛+12𝑚𝑚2𝑛𝑛+4𝑚𝑚3𝑛𝑛+𝑛𝑛2+4𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛2+4𝑚𝑚2𝑛𝑛2)� < 0.  
𝑄𝑄𝐹𝐹 − 𝑄𝑄𝐿𝐿 = 2𝑚𝑚(−𝐴𝐴+𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚)𝑛𝑛(2𝑚𝑚2(1+𝑛𝑛)+(2+𝑛𝑛)2+𝑚𝑚(4+𝑛𝑛(7+2𝑛𝑛)))((2+𝑛𝑛)2+𝑚𝑚(4+𝑛𝑛))(4(1+𝑚𝑚)3+(1+2𝑚𝑚)(4+𝑚𝑚(5+2𝑚𝑚))𝑛𝑛+(𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)2) < 0.  Q.E.D. 
12 
Proposition 4 supports the previous results in a duopoly with homogeneous products, in which the 
first-mover advantage increases the output of the PEs and total output compared to Cournot 
competition.11 However, in our model where SE has different objective function, the SEs expand their 
outputs more under private followership to increase social value, while the PEs care only for their profits 
and expand their output more under private leadership. 
Proposition 5: Total social welfare under private followership is lower than that under private 
leadership. 
Proof: Comparing the social welfare in (19) and (24) yields the following:  
𝑊𝑊𝐹𝐹 −𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿 = − 2𝑚𝑚(𝐴𝐴−𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚)2𝑛𝑛(2+𝑚𝑚+𝑛𝑛+𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)((2+𝑛𝑛)2+𝑚𝑚(4+𝑛𝑛))(4(1+𝑚𝑚)3+(1+2𝑚𝑚)(4+𝑚𝑚(5+2𝑚𝑚))𝑛𝑛+(𝑛𝑛+2𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)2) < 0.  Q.E.D. 
Proposition 5 indicates that private leadership is socially desirable than private followership because 
private leadership can induce PEs to behave aggressive, which increases total market outputs. This 
result is consistent with Cho and Lee (2017), who examined competition with single SE, but we confirm 
their result with multiple SEs. This finding also supports the previous result in the context of mixed 
markets where a profit-maximizing PE competes against a welfare-maximizing SE in a duopoly setting. 
For example, Pal (1998), Lu (2006), Ino and Matsumura (2010) and Matsumura and Ogawa (2014) 
examined the role of public and private firms with asymmetric payoffs in a mixed market and showed 
that either private or public leadership can improve welfare.  
5. Discussions 
We have assumed that the government can choose the optimal subsidy rate in the first stage, as a first-
mover. As proposition 2 states, the subsidy rate does not matter on the endogenous choice in the second 
stage. However, we wonder whether this result is invariant even if the government is the second-mover. 
If so, which condition is necessary? Thus, we will examine the reverse case that the government chooses 
the optimal subsidy rate in the second stage after the PEs choose the competition mode in the first stage. 
We assume that in the final stage, PEs and SEs choose outputs simultaneously or sequentially under the 
committed competition mode in the first stage. 
The equilibrium results in final stage are the same and described in Section 3.1 and 3.2. Also, the 
government choice on the optimal subsidy is also the same and described in Section 4.1 and 4.2. Thus, 
we need to examine the first stage where the PEs decide the endogenous choice on market competition. 
Then, from the profits ranks of PEs between the private followership and private leadership, Fig. 2 
shows the locus of 𝑛𝑛∗∗(𝑚𝑚) and 𝑛𝑛∗(𝑚𝑚).  
                                                                        
11 See, for example, Gal-Or (1985) and Dowrick (1986). 
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Fig. 2 The profits ranks of PEs under the optimal subsidy 
Proposition 6: Under the optimal subsidy, the profit of the PE under private leadership is higher than 
that under private followership when 𝑛𝑛 = 1 or 𝑛𝑛 <  𝑛𝑛∗∗(𝑚𝑚).  
Proof: Comparing the profits of PEs in (18) and (23) yields the following:  
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
𝐹𝐹 − 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
𝐿𝐿 = 1
2
(𝐴𝐴−𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚)2𝐾𝐾(𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛)
𝐻𝐻(𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛)  where 𝐻𝐻(𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛) = ((2 + 𝑛𝑛)2 + 𝑚𝑚(4 + 𝑛𝑛))2(4(1 + 𝑚𝑚)3 + (1 + 2𝑚𝑚)(4 +
𝑚𝑚(5 + 2𝑚𝑚))𝑛𝑛 + (𝑛𝑛 + 2𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)2)2  and 𝐾𝐾(𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛) = (4(1 + 𝑚𝑚)3 + (1 + 2𝑚𝑚)(4 + 𝑚𝑚(5 + 2𝑚𝑚))𝑛𝑛 + (𝑛𝑛 + 2𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)2)23(2 +
𝑛𝑛)2 − (3 + 4𝑚𝑚(2 + 𝑚𝑚))(2 + 𝑛𝑛 + 2𝑚𝑚(1 + 𝑛𝑛))2((2 + 𝑛𝑛)2 + 𝑚𝑚(4 + 𝑛𝑛))2.  Since 𝐴𝐴 > 𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚  and 𝐻𝐻(𝑛𝑛,𝑚𝑚) > 0 , the 
comparison depends on the sign of 𝐾𝐾(𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛). Then, we have 𝐾𝐾(𝑚𝑚, 1) < 0. Further, when 𝑛𝑛 ≥ 2, there 
exists 𝑚𝑚� , which satisfies 𝐾𝐾(𝑚𝑚� ,𝑛𝑛) = 0, since lim
𝑛𝑛→∞
𝐾𝐾(𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛) > 0 and lim
𝑚𝑚→∞
𝐾𝐾(𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛) < 0 when 𝑛𝑛 ≥2. Hence, given the number of SEs, 𝑚𝑚, we can get 𝑛𝑛∗∗(𝑚𝑚), which satisfies 𝐾𝐾(𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛) = 0 when 𝑛𝑛 ≥2. Q.E.D 
As shown in Fig. 2, the regions for the private leadership for being an equilibrium of endogenous 
competition mode is reduced when the government is the second-mover, in which it chooses the optimal 
subsidy after the PEs choose the competition mode. Then, proposition 5 and 6 support that total welfare 
is also reduced in that case. Hence, there is a first-mover advantage to support the private leadership 
equilibrium.  
Proposition 7: When the government decides the optimal subsidy after PEs choose the competition 
mode, the total social welfare is reduced when  𝑛𝑛∗∗(𝑚𝑚) < 𝑛𝑛 <  𝑛𝑛∗(𝑚𝑚). 
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Proposition 7 also states that the equilibrium of endogenous competition mode does not changed 
either when 𝑛𝑛 <  𝑛𝑛∗∗(𝑚𝑚) or 𝑛𝑛 >  𝑛𝑛∗(𝑚𝑚). In particular, the first-mover advantage disappears either 
when 𝑛𝑛 = 1 or when 𝑛𝑛 > 𝑚𝑚. It implies that either (i) when the number of PE is one or (ii) when the 
number of PE is larger than that of SE, there is no welfare change between first-mover and second-
mover of government choice on subsidization. Therefore, when  𝑛𝑛∗∗(𝑚𝑚) < 𝑛𝑛 <  𝑛𝑛∗(𝑚𝑚), the role of 
government should be emphasized in policy considerations when deciding subsidy policy.  
6. Conclusion 
The recent emergence of SEs and market competition with PEs has initiated the economic analysis 
on the performance of market structure and its welfare consequences. In this study, we have investigated 
the market role of PEs under government subsidy and examined the endogenous choice of private 
leadership. We showed that private leadership is better from the viewpoint of total social welfare, but 
the numbers of private and social enterprises affect the endogenous choices and welfare consequences. 
We also showed that the role of government in choosing the optimal subsidy policy will be significant 
when the number of PEs is larger than one but smaller than that of SEs. Otherwise, the first-mover 
advantage of the government does not exist.  
However, better understanding on the market role of the SEs requires further examination on the 
different organizational structure between shareholders (investors) and stakeholders (managers, 
employees, business partners, and consumers). In particular, the internal relations on managerial 
delegation in SEs are more significant because it will affect the social activities and the profit-sharing 
scheme. 12 Thus, the practical and innovative analysis on the social activities of the SEs and the 
evaluation process in deciding government subsidy policy are promising topics for future research.  
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